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JURISDICTION
Respondent sets forth the correct jurisdictional standard. This Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j), because this matter is on appeal from an
order of the Third District Court over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION BELOW
Although it is within the trial court's discretion to grant or deny a motion under Rule
54(b), with an appellate standard of review for abuse of discretion, in this case, the primary issue
presented for review is whether the March 22, 2002, order unconstitutionally violated appellant's
rights. The constitutionality of the March 22, 2002, order is a question of law. Conclusions of
law are accorded no particular deference, but are reviewed for correctness. (Trembly v. Mrs.
Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah 1994); Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817
P.2d 382, 385 (UTApp. 1991.)
On July 30, 2002, the court reporter, Alan P. Smith, filed an affidavit with the appellate
court which stated that the record of the June 17, 2002, hearing of appellant's motion for
reconsideration of the March 22, 2002, order was incomplete and inaudible. The Reporter's
Transcript of the Proceedings Below is adequate even thought the court reporter, Alan Smith,
could not completely transcribe the partially inaudible recording of the proceedings because: (1)
there is a record of appellant's pleadings; (2) a record that respondent failed to file any opposition
to appellant's motion; (3) a record of appellant's arguments at the hearing of their motion; and (4)
an order, prepared by respondent, which specifically finds that appellant's motion was denied on
the grounds that: "... the Felt Building, L.L.C., has no right or claim to any personal property of
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John Alex, or the law practice of John Alex, recovered by and in the possession of the trustee,
Mr. Loren Weiss." Appellant's citations to the pleadings, reporter's transcript, and order show
adequate support for all appellant's allegations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A, Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition below
Appellant had no notice of the March 22, 2002, order granting appellee possession of all
personal property located inside Mr. Alex's law office, until Friday late afternoon, March 29,
2002, when they were served with an order to show cause for contempt of the March 22, 2002,
order scheduled for the following business morning, Monday, April 1, 2002. At the hearing on
appellee's motion for an order of contempt, appellant stipulated to the release of property to
respondent, under threat of contempt, and promptly filed their motion for reconsideration of the
order. (Reporter's Transcript, designated "RT", pages 4-5, 7-9. Appellant's motion for
Reconsideration, pages 2-3).
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review
On August 13, 2002, the Utah Supreme Court notified appellant that their docketing
statement was deficient on the grounds that their July 18, 2002, notice of appeal appealing the
June 17, 2002, order was filed one day late. (Exhibit "B" attached hereto and incorporated by
reference.)
On August 16, 2002, appellant's attorney discovered the June 17, 2002, order had not
been entered or signed by Judge William Bohling, determined that the 30 day time limit to file a
notice of appeal was triggered by the date of entry of an order, personally appeared at the Utah
Supreme Court Clerk's Office and requested the return of her voluntary withdrawal of appeal,
which had been mailed to the court, but not filed. Appellant's original withdrawal of appeal was

rescinded and returned by the court clerk to appellant.
On August 19, 2002, appellant obtained the signature of respondent and Judge Bohling on
the June 17, 2002, order, which was entered on August 19, 2002. On the same day, appellant
filed an amended notice of appeal. On August 20, 2002, appellant mailed an amended docketing
statement, filed August 22, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, appellant was notified that a duplicate copy of their withdrawal of
appeal, returned to appellant on August 16, 2002, had been inadvertently filed, and an order was
dismissing this appeal, entered August 26, 2002. (Exhibit "C" attached hereto and incorporated by
reference. On August 27, 2002, pursuant to Rule 23 A, of the Rules of Appellate Procedure,
appellant filed a motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal of their appeal and reinstatement of
appeal. Appellant's appeal was reinstated by the Utah Supreme Court, September 12, 2002, and
reassigned the Supreme Court Case No. 20020727-SC.
At the June 17, 2002, hearing on appellant's motion for reconsideration of the March 22,
2002, order the following was said:
MS. KNOWLTON: "...Secondly, in that December 21 findings of facts and conclusions of law,
this court granted Loren Weiss, as trustee, all the powers enumerated in Rule 27 of- of the Rules
of Lawyer Discipline, and other powers necessary to fulfill his obligations as trustee, including
possession of all trust funds, third-party funds, and possession of all client files at the office or
residence." (Reporter's Transcript, page 3.)
And later:
MS. KNOWLTON: "This March 22, order gave the State Bar trustee the power to remove all the
furnishings, anything to be found in Mr. Weiss' office, and anything he found in Mr. Weiss'
residence, your Honor. We believe that order was in excess of this court's jurisdiction, that
there's no interest that the State Bar has in obtaining all of the furnishings located in a lawyer's
office and his residence, but that the order is excessive and that it oughtTHE COURT: "What are you asking to be returned to the premises?"
MS. KNOWLTON: "Your Honor, what we're asking to be returned is everything other- that was

removed from the law office, other than client files, client records, financial records, we have no
interest in that or any third-party funds that were available. My client, as the lessor, he had a
lessor's lien on all property withing Mr. Alex's office for 30 days from the date that he obtained
his restitution order."
"And then he had under the Utah Code section, the abandonment code section, which is
78-36-12.2, subsection 2, if a tenant abandons a premises and has left personal property, the
owner's entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant and recover the
actual moving costs and storage and the owner shall make reasonable efforts to notify the tenant
of the personal property, however the property has been in storage."
"Then my client not only under the 30 day statutory lien which gave him ownership of the
property, but under the abandonment statute, gave him authority to remove all the property for
another 30 days and hold it in storage and conduct a sale, which he had planned to do."
(Reporter's Transcript, pages 5-6)
And later the following was said:
MS. KNOWLTON: "I obtained- a copy of that order was mailed to the wrong address, to me, I
filed it with the Court, it's attached to my motion, with a copy of the original envelope and the
order contained in it. It was not mailed to my address, I had no prior knowledge of it, it was
mailed ironically to Mr. Weiss's address; my address is 341 South Main Street, the Felt Building,
but I, my office was in Suite 401, not Suite 410. I'll file with the Court as proof of that the
original envelope containing the March 22, 2002, order that was not mailed to me but was mailed
to Mr. Alex' office."
Therefore, your Honor, I did not have- obtain any knowledge of the March 22nd order
until the morning of April 1st, when we had this order to show cause for contempt. Mr. Knowlton
was served the 29th, that was a Friday, late in the afternoon. He called me and informed me that
he had been- that this was set for a contempt hearing the following Monday morning, and so I
appeared early, I reviewed the Court file and then I got a copy of the order to show cause from
Mr. Knowlton."
"And at that time, your Honor, I saw that there was a March 22, order awarding a giving the trustee power to remove everything from the office as well as from his residence;
therefore, I entered into an agreement with Mr. Weiss, an attorney from his office, in order to
dismiss the contempt charges because that order was outstanding and I-1 felt that it was not
necessary to subject my client to contempt because, on the grounds that Mr. Crawley was here
and I'm claiming under- that he served Mr. Knowlton when in fact he hadn't, and so in my mind,
your Honor, it became a question of who- who would we believe and why subject my client, The
Felt Building, to that kind of liability."
"The order that has been issued by your Honor, it was over-broad. It- under the
attorney-lawyer rule of discipline, the State Bar certainly has authority to take all client files and
client funds and third party funds from a lawyer, but it certainly does not or should not have-I
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don't believe it does- have the power, when a lawyer is disbarred, to take possession of
everything a lawyer has in his office and everything a lawyer has in his residence."
"Your Honor, that- that order is over-broad, it's unconstitutional and it's not authorized
by statute and it should be modified."(Reporter's Transcript pp. 8-9.)
Respondent did not file any opposition to appellant's motion for reconsideration.
I
APPELLANT COMPLIED WITH ALL
APPLICABLE RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
Judge William Bohling's July 17, 2002, order denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration, was not signed or entered until August 19, 2002; therefore, appellant corrected
their deficient July 18, 2002, notice of appeal and filed a correct amended notice of appeal on
August 19, 2002. Appellant's amended docketing statement was timely filed on August 22, 2002,
within 21 days after the August 19, 2002, filing of her notice of appeal.
On August 16, 2002, appellant's attorney's appeared in the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's
Office and obtained the return of her original withdrawal of appeal, which had been mailed but not
filed by the court. The irregularity in this case arose because a second withdrawal of appeal was
found by the court and inadvertently filed after appellant had retrieved and rescinded her original
withdrawal of appeal. The August 26, 2002, dismissal of this appeal was based on the inadvertent
filing of a duplicate copy off appellant's withdrawal of appeal; accordingly, the voluntary dismissal
was set aside by this Court and this appeal reinstated September 12, 2002.
Rule 9(a) provides that the docketing statement shall be filed "(w)ithin 21 days after a
notice of appeal is filed." Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 9(a) states the purpose of a
docketing statement. Rule 9(g) provides for the consequences for failure to comply. "The plain
language of Rule 9(a) indicates that dismissal is discretionary." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 19 P.3d

1110, 1115 (Utah 2000). While timely filing is necessary, the record does not reflect any problem
that arose in the appellant court as a result of untimely filing. Therefore it is apparent that the
purpose of the docketing statement, as set forth in Rule 9(b) is served. (Id., at p. 1116.)
Appellant's amended notice of appeal was filed August 19, 2002, and amended docketing
statement filed August 22, 2002; therefore, appellant's docketing statement was timely, filed in
compliance with Rule 9(a), and the record does not reflect any problems that arose from the filing
of appellant's docketing statement; therefore, this Court's reinstatement of this appeal was
warranted and appropriate.
II
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IS
AFFORDED NO DEFERENCE AND IS
REVIEWED FOR CORRECTNESS
A. Appellant's stipulation to release property to appellee, obtained under threat of
contempt, did not waive their right to challenge the constitutionality of that order.
Appellant had no notice of the March 22, 2002, order granting appellee possession of all
personal property located inside Mr. Alex's law office, until Friday late afternoon, March 29,
2002, when they were served with an order to show cause for contempt scheduled for the
following business morning, Monday, April 1, 2002. At the hearing of appellee's motion for an
order for contempt of the March 22, 2002, order, appellant stipulated to the release of all
property to respondent, under threat of contempt, and promptly filed their motion for
reconsideration of the order. (Reporter's Transcript, designated "RT", pages 4-5, 7-9.
Appellant's motion for Reconsideration, pages 2-3).
Appellant is not required to suffer a finding of contempt in order to challenge the
constitutionality of that order. Their stipulation to release Mr. Alex's property in compliance with
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the March 22, 2002, order until appellant had an opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration
and obtain a hearing on the issue was procedurally correct. "A Rule 54 (b) motion is the proper
procedure to set aside an order which is entered without notice to third parties who claim an
interest on the property." (Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 1312 (Utah 1994). In
Trembly v, Mrs. Field's Cookies, supra, cited in Appellee's brief, the court addressed and
distinguished both standards of review present in this case.
At the hearing of appellee's motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002,
order, the following was said:
MS. KNOWLTON: "I obtained- a copy of that order was mailed to the wrong address, to me, I
filed it with the Court, it's attached to my motion, with a copy of the original envelope and the
order contained in it. It was not mailed to my address, I had no prior knowledge of it, it was
mailed ironically to Mr. Weiss's address; my address is 341 South Main Street, the Felt Building,
but I, my office was in Suite 401, not Suite 410. I'll file with the Court as proof of that the
original envelope containing the March 22, 2002, order that was not mailed to me but was mailed
to Mr. Alex' office."
"Therefore, your Honor, I did not have- obtain any knowledge of the March 22nd order
until the morning of April 1st, when we had this order to show cause for contempt. Mr. Knowlton
was served the 29th, that was a Friday, late in the afternoon. He called me and informed me that
he had been- that this was set for a contempt hearing the following Monday morning, and so I
appeared early, I reviewed the Court file and then I got a copy of the order to show cause from
Mr. Knowlton."
u

And at that time, your Honor, I saw that there was a March 22, order awarding a - giving
the trustee power to remove everything from the office as well as from his residence; therefore, I
entered into an agreement with Mr. Weiss, an attorney from his office, in order to dismiss the
contempt charges because that order was outstanding and I-1 felt that it was not necessary to
subject my client to contempt because, on the grounds that Mr. Crawley was here and I'm
claiming under- that he served Mr. Knowlton when in fact he hadn't, and so in my mind, your
Honor, it became a question of who- who would we believe and why subject my client, The Felt
Building, to that kind of liability." (Reporter's Transcript, p. 8-9.)
Appellant, who was not given notice of the March 22, 2002, order until the Friday
afternoon of March 29, 2002, less than one business day prior to the April 1, 2002, hearing for
contempt of that order, was not required to suffer a finding of contempt for their refusal to release
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all of Mr. Alex's property to the State Bar Trustee, in order to preserve their right to challenge
the constitutionality of that order, but entitled to stipulate to the release the property and address
the issue in a Rule 54(a) motion for reconsideration of that order.
B. The record adequately reflects appellant's constitutional and Rule 27 argument.
At the hearing on appellant's motion for reconsideration of the March 22, 2002, order,
June 17, 2002, appellant stated the following:
MS. KNOWLTON: "...Secondly, in that December 21 findings of facts and conclusions of law,
this court granted Loren Weiss, as trustee, all the powers enumerated in Rule 27 of- of the Rules
of Lawyer Discipline, and other powers necessary to fulfill his obligations as trustee, including
possession of all trust funds, third-party funds, and possession of all client files at the office or
residence." (Reporter's Transcript, page 3.)
And later:
MS. KNOWLTON: "This March 22, order gave the State Bar trustee the power to remove all
the furnishings, anything to be found in Mr. Weiss' office, and anything he found in Mr. Weiss'
residence, your Honor. We believe that order was in excess of this court's jurisdiction, that
there's no interest that the State Bar has in obtaining all of the furnishings located in a lawyer's
office and his residence, but that the order is excessive and that it oughtTHE COURT: "What are you asking to be returned to the premises?"
MS. KNOWLTON: "Your Honor, what we're asking to be returned is everything other- that was
removed from the law office, other than client files, client records, financial records, we have no
interest in that or any third-party funds that were available. My client, as the lessor, he had a
lessor's lien on all property withing Mr. Alex's office for 30 days from the date that he obtained
his restitution order..." (Reporter's Transcript pp. 5-6.)
And later the following was said:
MS. KNOWLTON: "The order that has been issued by your Honor, it was over-broad. It- under
the attorney-lawyer rule of discipline, the State Bar certainly has authority to take all client files
and client funds and third party funds from a lawyer, but it certainly does not or should not have-I
don't believe it does- have the power, when a lawyer is disbarred, to take possession of
everything a lawyer has in his office and everything a lawyer has in his residence."
"Your Honor, that- that order is over-broad, it's unconstitutional and it's not authorized
by statute and it should be modified." (Reporter's Transcript p. 9.)

The constitutionality of the March 22, 2002, order was raised by appellant and
the record adequately reflects that argument.
C. Appellee failed to perfect their rights, if any, under Section 78-36-12.6 and failed to file
any opposition to appellant's motion.
Respondent claims that the statute governing issuance of restitution orders, Section 7836-10.5 is applicable to property abandoned by a tenant rather than Section 78-36-12.6, the
abandonment statute; even assuming arguendo, that Section 78-36-105, is appropriate or useful,
appellee never complied with the mandatory provisions subsection (f), of Section 78-36-12.6, and
never raised the issue.
Appellee never made a written demand for the release of Mr. Alex's property, nor
provided evidence of ownership, as required under subsection (f) of Section 78-36-10.5, but
simply served appellant with an order to show cause for contempt one business day before the
April 1, 2002, hearing on their motion for contempt, never raised the issue in the trial court, and
waived all objections by failing to file any written objection to appellant's motion for
reconsideration of the order.
At the June 17, 2002, hearing on appellant's motion, the following was said:
MS. KNOWLTON: "...And then he had under the Utah Code section, the abandonment code
section, which is 78-36-12.2, subsection 2, if a tenant abandons a premises and has left personal
property, the owner's entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it for the tenant
and recover the actual moving costs and storage and the owner shall make reasonable efforts to
notify the tenant of the personal property, however the property has been in storage."
Under both abandonment and restitution statutes, appellant, as lessor in possession of
property abandoned on their premises by a defaulting tenant, and as judgment creditor entitled to
possession of the premises, appellant owned an property interest in the abandoned property
greater than that, if any, owned by the Utah State Bar Trustee.
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CONCLUSION
The March 22, 2002, order exceeded the scope of Rule 27, of Rules of Lawyer Discipline
and Disability, and unconstitutionally authorized the Utah State Bar Trustee to take possession of
all property located in Mr. Alex's law office and residence. The order was issued without notice
to appellant, known by appellee to be the owner, judgment creditor and lessor in possession of
property abandoned by Mr. Alex in his law office, and unconstitutionally gave property owned by
appellant, to the State Bar Trustee, in violation of appellant's property and due process rights.
The March 22, 2002, order is based on the trial court's erroneous and dangerous
conclusion that under Rule 27, the district court has authority to allow the Utah State Bar Trustee
without notice or opportunity to be heard, to take possession of all property located in a
disbarred lawyer's law office and residence. The order is unconstitutional, is afforded no
special deference, is an abuse of discretion, and should be vacated, with an award of attorney's
fees and costs incurred by appellant as a result of that order.
Dated:

Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH KNOWLTON
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, ELIZABETH KNOWLTON, hereby certify that on j07/-*/
£&
, 2003,1
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoingreply to the following address:
LOREN WEISS, Trustee
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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HONORABLE WILLIAM BOHLING
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit Al:

Reporter's Certificate, dated July 28, 2002

Exhibit A2:

Transcriber's Certificate, dated July 28,2002

Exhibit "B"

August 13, 2002, Notice of Deficiency

Exhibit "C"

August 23,2002, Order of Dismissal

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah,
do certify that I received an electronically recorded
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
numbered from 1 to 10, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge,
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings
were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise
interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of
July, 2002.
?<OTf£ftYFL>8.:C
r!

*IVE

ft. ^yS»Hfo \;
i l V l § # J $ COMMISSION EXP.RES
&<2Z>y
DECEMBER 4, 2005
•N^t* *

<CT/T£ OF UTAH

Not&ry Public

( S E A L )
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^Eth-hf' 4,

TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received electronically
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 10, inclusive, to the
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise
interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of
July, 2002

^A

<J(n^
K^

A,

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day
of July, 2002.
JOiARV P'uB'.'C
AU

\! r

SMJTM

335 BRAHh'A DRIVE
MURRAY, UT84107
CO^Vi'SSiGrt EXF-PCS
DECEMBfcR 4, 2005
SVTEOF-CAH

(

Of

v,, / • (<>hu0£.

Notary Public

S E A L )

11
^

{ttJjristtne <flL Purfjain
4 5 0 ^autii £bdt ^ t r t e t
J . © . $ n x 140210
£ a l i ?Qake Cfctg, JUaif 84114-0210

jtlallljfiu y _ ^9urraitt
<A»»ociair

(Rlpcf Justtcr

^Ridptrft C. JHoffft
(Klerks' ©fficr
maep!{ime (801) 5 7 8 - 3 9 0 0
Jfax (801) 5 7 8 - 3 9 9 9
fff^B (801) 5 7 8 - 3 9 4 0

Jnsticc

<Ajjpeflair

,Appcllat* (Honct (Airtnini»trator

jlat 3L JBartlpiiraitfci
Clerk

^Cronarh £L ^Russtm
Justice

^ i d p a l 1 . pUkins

Jguprera* flWri JUajptton 238-7967

August 13, 2002

Ms. Elizabeth Knowlton
Bannock County Public Defenders' Office
P.O. Box 4147
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4147
Re:
No.

In Re John Alex
20020619

Dear Ms Knowlton.

The docketing statement you have filed with this court under rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure is deficient in the following particulars under rule 9:
You inform the court that an order was entered on June 17, 2 0 0 2 , and that you filed your notice of
appeal on July 18, 2 0 0 2 . You have not attached any extension of time to file appeal granted by the trial
court, and from the face of your docketing statement, it appears that your appeal is one day late. Please
inform this court, if the dates are incorrect or submit an extension if you have obtained one.
The docketing statement in its present form is rejected. Please amend it, supplying
information as indicated within ten days from the date of this letter, or your appeal will be dismissed under
rule 9(g) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Very truly yours,

Antje F. Curry
Central Staff Attorney
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JuBtict

FILED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH SUPREME COURT

00O00

AUG 2 3 2002
PAT BARTHOLOMEW
CLERK OF THE COURT

In the Matter of the Discipline
of John Alex, 6696.
The Felt Building,
Appellant,
No. 20020619-SC
990909957

v,
Utah State Bar,
Appellee.

ORDER

This matter is before the court upon appellant's voluntary
withdrawal of the appeal in the above-entitled matter, filed on
August 16, 2002.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Utah
Rules of Appellant Procedure the appeal in the above-entitled
matter is dismissed.
FURTHER the Supreme Court does not have
the authority to act upon the request for refund of the $300.00
bond, filed with the district court.

For the Court

•2$ ^oo
Dat

a.
Pat H. Bartholomew
Clerk of Court

